The Cunningham Papers -The Mediterranean
Naval War, 1939 to 42
(Naval Records Society, volume 140 - private
and official correspondence)
Cunningham was impatient if people were slow and could be
irritable but full of fun and liked a joke. He had good relations
with Admiral Dudley Pound , the First Sea Lord. Pound was
careful and not as aggressive as Cunningham. Both agreed
that the Mediterranean fleet need more ship and air support.
Cunningham felt that Malta was the lynchpin of the Mediterranean
naval war being the base to stop the enemy supply convoys
and the springboard for the invasion of Italy.
Cunningham disliked the continuous pressure he was receiving
from Churchill for an offensive and called his wild schemes
irksome. He was particularly annoyed at the idea to block
Tripoli harbour in Libya using the battleship Barham. Churchill
was frustrated that enemy ships were getting through with
valuable armaments and supplies. Cunningham called it insulting,
childish and totally unrealistic. He had thoughts of Gallipolli.
It would be an extremely difficult operation, a waste of
a battleship and could be quickly reopened. It was too simplistic.
Actually, on 20 April 1941, a bombardment was carried out
by three battleships and a carrier in conjunction with a
Malta convoy. It was a tricky operation but was successful
and some damage to the port was done.
What Cunningham needed was more RAF and Fleet Air Arm aircraft.
The carrier HMS Illustrious was almost sunk by German aircaft.
Air Marshall Longmore, an ex WW1 RN Air Service officer,
was being helpful in providing air reconnaissance though
he had heavy demands providing air defence for Greece and
Crete, for Alexandria, the desert war and the Suex Canal.
Cunningham was not in favour of the Greece operation but
did what he could to carry the operation. He thought the
defence of Crete was problematical.
He was critical of Admiral King for not attacking an enemy
sea convoy carrying troops from Greece to Crete even though
his force of cruisers and destroyers were well o the north
of Crete and could have been delayed and subject to air attack
after dawn. If these troops had been drowned it could have
made the difference in holding Crete and winning the battle.
It was a close run campaign. It would have been worth it
even if King’s ships had been sunk.
He kept pressing for more aircraft to the annoyance of Churchill.
He had worked well with General Wavell and Air Marshall Longmore.
But the new replacements of General Auklinleck and Air Marshall
Tedder were less amenable to his way of thinking. The number
of aircraft for solely naval purposes , in Malta, the desert,
Alexandria, Palestine and the Red Sea were in 40s.
The damaging of the two battleships in Alexandria harbour
in 19 December 1941, was not well handled and the board of
enquiry recommended that the boom was not to be opened at
night except in an emergency and the size and number of harbour
patrols were to be increased and the size of explosives dropped
were to be larger.
Note. Once we had won the Battle of El Alamein in November
1942 and America came into the war everything changed for
the better. Victory was now attainable and not a problematical
hope. Cunningham was transferred to Washington in April 1943
to liaise with the Americans. He was appointed to be General
Eisenhower’s deputy for naval operations for the landings
in Morocco and Algeria. With his Mediterranean experienced
he recommended that landings should have been planned for
Tunis as well as for Algiers. It was decided that this might
be too risky and was not followed up. If it had been done,
it might have shortened the length of the war.
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