Change in delusions is associated with change in “jumping to conclusions”

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A B S T R A C T
Evidence has been put forward that premature termination of data collection and jumping to conclusions behavior (JTC) is associated with delusions. However, few investigations have attempted to track associations between changes in delusions and changes in JTC measures. In the current study individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders completed a version of the JTC task (involving fishing from lakes as opposed to drawing beads from a jar) at two timepoints 12 weeks apart. The results revealed significant negative correlations between change in task performance (number of requested pieces of information) and change in delusion scores over time. This evidence is consistent with the contention that the JTC task is sensitive to the cognitive systems underlying delusions in schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

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1. Introduction

Delusions are consensually defined as fixed false beliefs not amenable to contrary evidence, and are hallmark symptoms of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although it was initially proposed that delusional ideation cannot be explained by a pathology of reasoning (Maher, 1988), recent work has revealed a number of aberrations in reasoning in individuals with schizophrenia with current or past delusional ideas (Bell et al., 2006; Blackwood et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2001; Garety and Freeman, 1999).

One of the most commonly studied reasoning paradigms is known as the jumping to conclusions (JTC; Garety et al., 1991; Huq et al., 1988) paradigm, and is widely cited and reviewed (Bell et al., 2006; Blackwood et al., 2001; Davies et al., 2001; Garety and Freeman, 1999). JTC paradigms typically involve the beads task, where the subject is presented with jars containing beads of two colours (e.g., black and white beads divided 60–40 in one jar and 40–60 in the other) and are asked from which jar beads are being drawn when the jars have been hidden from view. Individuals with schizophrenia tend to request fewer beads before deciding on which jar is the source of the beads (draws-to-decision procedure). The dominant interpretation of this finding is that individuals with schizophrenia display a data gathering bias, in that they seek less information before reaching a decision (Garety and Freeman, 1999).

However, the literature on whether or not JTC correlates with delusions is mixed, as a JTC bias has been observed for both currently deluded and non-deluded individuals with schizophrenia (Menon et al., 2006; Moritz and Woodward, 2005), and in some studies an association with delusions is absent (McKay et al., 2007; Young and Bentall, 1997). Some studies report that the association with delusions depends on methodological variables, such as the requirement to self-terminate the trial by indicating that they have enough information to decide (Garety et al., 1991; Moritz and Woodward, 2005; van Dael et al., 2006), and/or high working memory load (i.e., the jars are hidden from view and the bead is replaced in the jar after being viewed; Menon et al., 2006).

Unfortunately cross sectional studies cannot provide definitive evidence for the cognitive underpinnings of delusions, for two main reasons. First, between-group comparisons of conditions (e.g., delusional vs. non-delusional individuals) are less powerful than within-group comparisons, because any differences between the subjects contribute to the error term in the between-group design, but much of this source of error is subtracted out of the error term when each subject is used as his or her own control. Second, individuals currently displaying delusions may tend to possess certain characteristics that would not change if the delusions were to go into remission, such as a genetic predisposition that affects cognitive performance and/or a pre-existing cognitive style. A longitudinal study is more powerful and interpretable, because pre-existing differences between non-delusional and delusional conditions will be held constant as delusions change.
This is feasible because delusions change in their severity over time in response to treatment, or spontaneously (Eaton et al., 1995; Gunduz-Bruce et al., 2005; Lieberman et al., 1993; Sherwood et al., 2006). A computational model of JTC behavior (Moore and Sellen, 2006), for which a gain parameter was employed to model increases and decreases in dopamine levels in delusional individuals, predicted that changes in delusions should correspond with changes in JTC behavior.

Longitudinal studies investigating the association of change in JTC with change in delusions over time have been carried out in the past using the beads task, with mixed results. In a recent longitudinal study, a JTC pattern in delusional individuals was stable over time despite improving symptomatology (Peters and Garety, 2006). A different study found that although performance on a beads task predicted subsequent change in positive symptoms, non-significant correlations between changes in task performance and changes in symptomatology were observed (Menon et al., 2008).

Although both of these studies employed the draws-to-decision procedure, only one and two series of beads, respectively, were administered. In order to increase comprehensibility of the task instructions, we developed a new JTC paradigm that involved a scenario of a fisherman fishing from two lakes, and developed a number of conditions that allowed four series of “beads” (or fish in this case) to be presented. We used this variation of the beads task (Huq et al., 1988) with a draws-to-decision procedure (Dudley et al., 1997; Fear and Healy, 1997; Menon et al., 2008; Moritz and Woodward, 2005) in a longitudinal study involving pre- and post-assessment of a sample of individuals undergoing group cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT; Lecomte et al., 2008) or control treatments. According to an account holding that the JTC bias is a cognitive underpinning of delusions, we expected to observe a correlation between change in delusion scores and change in task performance, such that a decrease in JTC behavior should correspond with a decrease in delusions, and vice versa.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

All participants were taking part in a longitudinal randomized controlled trial on group CBT for early psychosis (Lecomte et al., 2008). Potential participants were recruited from Early Psychosis Intervention programs and community mental health clinics in Quebec and British Columbia, Canada. Individuals were eligible if aged between 18 and 35, fluent (verbally as well as reading and writing skills) in one of the official languages (English and French), currently presenting with persistent or fluctuating psychotic symptoms (defined as delusions or hallucinations appearing occasionally, such as in periods of stress), having consulted for the first time a mental health professional for psychotic symptoms in the past 2 years, and being followed by a psychiatrist (and therefore receiving antipsychotic medication). Individuals were only recruited once they had been discharged from the hospital and considered ‘stabilized’ by their psychiatrist. Exclusion criteria included: suffering from an organic disorder, having already received one of the interventions, and not being able to give informed consent. Capacity to give informed consent was verified by a true-false questionnaire given after the study and consent form were explained.

In order to estimate symptom severity, all participants were assessed by trained clinicians with the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale semi-structured interview (BPRS; Ventura et al., 1991) at both Time 1 and Time 2. The BPRS is a widely used psychiatric rating scale that consists of 24 symptom constructs, each reaching from 1 (not present) to 7 (extremely severe). Delusion scores were assessed by computing the mean of BPRS 8 (“grandiosity”), BPRS 9 (“suspiciousness”) and BPRS 11 (“unusual thought content”).

The JTC fish task was administered pre- (Time 1) and post-treatment (Time 2) to a subset of 26 individuals with schizophrenia in the trial. The 19 individuals showing changes in delusion scores from Time 1 to Time 2 were included in the analysis. Fifteen individuals displayed decreases in delusions from Time 1 to Time 2, with the mean delusion score being M = 3.56 (S.D. = 1.40) at Time 1 and M = 1.87 (S.D. = 1.07) at Time 2. Four individuals displayed increases in delusions from Time 1 to Time 2, with the mean delusion score being M = 2.58 (S.D. = 1.20) at Time 1 and M = 3.50 (S.D. = 1.26) at Time 2. Of these individuals, 6 displayed decreases on hallucinations (BPRS item 10; Time 1 M = 4.67, Time 2 M = 1.67) and 4 displayed increases (Time 1 M = 2.00, Time 2 M = 4.75). 7 displayed decreases on depression (BPRS item 3; Time 1 M = 1.57, Time 2 M = 1.57) and 3 displayed increases (Time 1 M = 2.00, Time 2 M = 3.67), and 2 displayed decreases on thought disorder (BPRS item 15; Time 1 M = 3.00, Time 2 M = 1.00). None displayed increases on thought disorder, and none changed on negative symptoms (computed as the mean of BPRS items blunted affect, emotional withdrawal, and motor retardation). None of these symptom changes correlated with the JTC mean, so they will not be discussed further.

Eleven of the 19 were treated with group CBT (see Lecomte et al., 2001), four completed a skills training Symptom Management Training (SM; Liberman et al., 1988) and four were in a wait-list control group. Participants received 24 sessions of either CBT or SM over a period of 6 months, with 2 sessions per week during the first 6 weeks, then 1 session per week during the remaining 10 weeks. The CBT protocol integrates the principles and philosophy of individual CBT for psychosis, but adapted to a group format and tailored for first episodes. A detailed description of the intervention is described elsewhere (Lecomte et al., 2003). The Symptom Management (SM) module was developed by UCLA Psychiatric Rehabilitation Consultants (Liberman et al., 1988). The treatment aims at building four skill areas: 1) identifying warning signs of relapse, 2) managing warning signs, 3) coping with persistent symptoms and 4) avoiding alcohol and street drugs.

Fourteen individuals had an established Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnosis of schizophrenia (paranoid: n = 13, undifferentiated: n = 1). One participant was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. The remaining four individuals were diagnosed with psychosis NOS, with three also having an Axis I diagnosis of substance abuse. All diagnoses were confirmed by trained clinicians using the computerized version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID; First et al., 1997). With respect to demographic information, the mean age was 24.53 (S.D. = 6.04), mean illness duration/years was 2.69 (S.D. = 4.59), mean years of education was 12.95 (S.D. = 1.65), and the gender ratio (female: male) was 3:16.

2.2. Materials

Materials prepared for this task consisted of (1) two lakes, each containing 50 fish, with 60%–60% of white-black fish in the top lake, and 40% black fish in the bottom lake, labeled Lake A and Lake B respectively, printed on an 8.5 × 11 piece of paper, (2) pictures of white and black fish, 3 cm high and 12 cm long, printed onto 8.5 × 11 pieces of paper with a grey background, and (3) a scoresheet, used and seen only by the experimenter, whereby the experimenter indicated whether or not the fish in the bottom lake were white or black. The possible 10 fish were requested to be viewed. The 10 pages representing the 10 fish to be viewed for each series of fish were placed into a three ring binder in the appropriate order, and a page was turned and exposed to the subject each time a fish was “caught”.

2.3. Procedure

The experimenter began by saying to the participant “I’m going to show you pictures of two different lakes. Lake A has 60% white fish, and 40% black fish. Lake B, on the other hand, has 40% white fish, and 60% black fish. Just to make sure that you understand, I’m going to ask you, which lake has more white fish than black fish? Which lake has more black fish than white fish?” Once the participants respond with correct answers including the names of the lakes, the experimenter said “Now, I’m going to show you some pictures, one at a time, if that fish that was caught from one of these lakes. After each fish is caught, it is put back in the lake and allowed to swim away. All of these fish that I’m about to show you will be caught from the same lake. Your task will be to decide whether you think that they’re all caught from Lake A, or all caught from Lake B. After you’ve guessed that I show you, indicate whether you want to see more fish, or you have decided. Here is a picture of a fish that was caught from one of the lakes.” At that point, the first picture of an individual fish was displayed. After this and each following picture was shown, the experimenter asked “Do you want to see more fish, or have you decided?” Each fish that was shown was recorded on the scoresheet.

Series 1 and 2 differed in that verbal prompting regarding the ratios of fish in the lakes was provided by the experimenter in Series 1, but not in Series 2, creating a higher cognitive load condition in the latter series, possibly leading to reduced conservativism. In Series 3 and 4, there was monetary reward for correct responses in order to introduce a motivational component. The purpose of this manipulation was that reward may increase conservativism, possibly increasing the number of requested pieces of information and avoiding a floor effect for delusional participants. In Series 3, participants were rewarded $0.25 for a correct response (Lake A or B, whichever most closely matched the proportion of fish presented) independent of the number of fish they requested to view. In Series 4, participants were rewarded $5. For the reward conditions, the instructions were: “Now, we’re going to do a task similar to the one we just did, but with new lakes and a new group of fish that have been caught. If you answer correctly, you will win 25 cents/5 dollars. If not, you won’t get to keep this money.” The order of series administration was not randomized, because it was necessary to introduce that most basic task instructions before moving on to the more complex series (e.g., involving motivational manipulations). The four series of fish were presented in the following order:

Series 1: B–W–B–W–W–B–B

where B = black fish and W = white fish.

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3. Results

The mean number of requested catches at Time 1 and Time 2 is reported in Table 1 as a function of the four series conditions and direction of change in delusions. To investigate the impact of repeated testing sessions and series conditions, a 2 × 4 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out, with Session (Time 1 and Time 2) and Series (Series 1, 2, 3, and 4) as within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed a significant Session effect, $F(1,18) = 5.79$, $P = 0.05$, but no significant Series effect, $F(3,51) = 0.83$, $P = 0.48$, and no significant Session × Series interaction, $F(3,54) = 0.57$, $P = 0.64$. The Session effect was characterized by a decrease in delusion scores from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 1). Adding direction of change in delusions as a between-subjects factor produced a 2 × 4 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA, and this resulted in a nonsignificant main effect for this factor, $F(1,17) = 0.61$, $P = 0.54$. This factor did not interact significantly with Session or Series (all $P$s > 0.15).

Spearman rank correlation coefficients were used to assess the correspondence between change in delusion scores and change in the number of requested fish (allowing the equal interval assumption can be relaxed). A one-tailed test was used, under the hypothesis that more fish would be requested when the severity of delusions reduced, and fewer fish would be requested when the severity of delusions increased.

There were significant negative correlations between the change in delusion severity and the change in number of requested catches for Series 1 (lower cognitive load), $r(17) = -0.48$, $P = 0.05$, and Series 4 ($5 reward for correct answer), $r(17) = -0.55$, $P = 0.01$. In Series 2 (higher cognitive load) and 3 ($0.25 reward for correct answer), changes in delusions scores were also negatively correlated with requested fish, but these did not reach statistical significance, $r(17) = -0.35$, $P = 0.07$, $r(17) = -0.36$, $P = 0.07$, respectively.

4. Discussion

Evidence has been put forward that premature termination of data collection and jumping to conclusions behavior (JTC) is associated with delusions. However, investigations that have attempted to track associations between changes in delusions and changes in JTC measures have found mixed results. In the current study individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders completed a version of the JTC task involving fishing from lakes as opposed to drawing beads from a jar before and after administration of CBT or a control condition.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Time 1</th>
<th>Time 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All subjects (n = 19)</td>
<td>7.11 (3.49)</td>
<td>5.74 (3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 1: lower cognitive load</td>
<td>7.32 (3.35)</td>
<td>5.89 (3.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 2: higher cognitive load</td>
<td>7.11 (3.49)</td>
<td>5.74 (3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 3: $0.25 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>6.84 (3.40)</td>
<td>5.58 (3.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 4: $5 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>6.74 (3.31)</td>
<td>5.74 (3.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects with decreasing delusions (n = 15; 3.56 to 1.87)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Series 1: lower cognitive load</td>
<td>6.60 (3.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 2: higher cognitive load</td>
<td>6.87 (3.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 3: $0.25 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>6.47 (3.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 4: $5 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>6.27 (3.51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects with increasing delusions (n = 4; 2.58 to 3.50)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Series 1: lower cognitive load</td>
<td>10.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 2: higher cognitive load</td>
<td>8.00 (2.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 3: $0.25 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>8.25 (2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Series 4: $5 reward for correct answer</td>
<td>8.50 (1.91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results revealed a negative correlation between task performance (number of requested fish) and change in delusion scores over time. This evidence is consistent with the contention that the JTC task is sensitive to the cognitive systems underlying delusions in schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

A general trend was observed whereby conservatism decreased from Time 1 to Time 2. This was statistically significant, and should be considered a type of repeated testing effect, whereby participants may have learned the testing protocol, and are requesting fewer pieces of information at the second testing session due to familiarity with the task. The results presented in Table 1 suggest that this earlier termination of information gathering from Time 1 to Time 2 was greater in individuals with increasing delusions relative to those with decreasing delusions; however, this did not reach statistical significance. Despite this result when comparing group means, this likely contributed to the observed correlations. In other words, these correlations suggest that a general trend of earlier termination of information gathering from Time 1 to Time 2 was greater in patients with increasing delusions relative to those with decreasing delusions. The experimental manipulations of cognitive load and motivation did not affect the draws to decision, and reasons for this are discussed below.

In similar longitudinal studies, the JTC bias for the beads task was found to remain stable with changes in delusions (Menon et al., 2008; Peters and Garety, 2006). There are two main factors that may explain these discrepancies. First, in both aforementioned studies, individuals were selected for inclusion in the study if they were experiencing a psychotic episode, and delusions typically decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 (there is no report of observing higher delusion scores at Time 2 compared to Time 1 in either study). In this situation, in order to observe a correlation between change in delusion scores and change in JTC performance in the predicted direction, the number of requested pieces of information must increase from Time 1 to Time 2. Note that in the current study participants tended to respond in a less conservative fashion with multiple test sessions, possibly due to increased familiarity with the task, leading to higher confidence and earlier decision making (see Peters and Garety, 2006 for more evidence of this effect). This suggests that any increase in the number of pieces of information requested (e.g., due to decreasing delusions) is likely countered by a decrease in the number of pieces of requested information as is expected with repeated testing. In fact, in a previous study, a possible increase in number of requested beads with decreasing delusions may have been masked by a counteracting decrease in the number of requested beads due to practice (see Peters and Garety, 2006). In the current study, a general trend of earlier termination of information gathering from Time 1 to Time 2 was observed, but this was greater in individuals with increasing delusions relative to those with decreasing delusions, producing the observed correlations (see Table 1). Thus, it may be important to include individuals displaying an increase in delusions over time as well as those displaying a decrease, in order to expand the variance on the delusions change score, and to allow decreases in the number of requested pieces of information (i.e., beads or fish) to contribute to the correlation in addition to increases.

Second, methodological differences are present. In one of these studies (Peters and Garety, 2006), correspondences between individual differences were averaged over, and instead an ANOVA design was employed (Group × Time interaction), limiting comparability to the current results. In the other study (Menon et al., 2008), a trend in the predicted direction was observed ($r = -0.26$) but this depended on the version of the task, such that change in a neutral version of the JTC task produced a higher correlation with change in delusions than change in an emotional version. Thus, some evidence for a correspondence between changes in delusions and changes in JTC was present in both of these previous studies, but direct comparisons are not possible due to methodological differences.
Our attempted manipulations of cognitive load and motivation did not substantially impact the results (see Table 1 and the reported correlations). It is possible that these null results may have been attributable to deficient manipulation strength. With respect to the cognitive load manipulation, although the ratios of black to white fish in the lakes were not explicitly mentioned to the subjects in the higher load condition, the lakes were still visible. A stronger manipulation would be to remove the lakes completely from view of the subjects. With respect to manipulation of reward, subjects may have been performing at the limit of their available skill set in all conditions, and may not have been able to generate a strategy for changing performance even with financial incentives. A stronger manipulation could involve more intensive training on the task in order to develop a skill set that could be adjusted with respect to conservatism, allowing subjects to weigh risk against reward more meaningfully.

Other limitations to the present study must be acknowledged. First, the study must be regarded as a pilot study due to the small sample size. Second, the observed learning effect, and that from a previous study (Peters and Garety, 2006), may be attributable to using identical versions of the task at Time 1 and Time 2, and although this may reduce error attributable to administering different versions of the task over time, parallel versions may mitigate the learning effect. Third, in order avoid diluting the effect of interest, only individuals who chose 80% of the correct answers were included in the analysis. Adding the seven individuals who received the JTC task but did not change in delusions reduced the magnitude of the correlations to varying degrees. Due to the preliminary nature of the data we did not examine these interactions in detail, as this level of analysis would only be possible using a larger sample size. Fourth, the series of fish were presented in a fixed order. This was necessary in order to introduce the most basic instructions before moving on to the more complex series (e.g., involving motivational manipulations), but this confounds an order effect with the experimental manipulations. For future research, this potential confound could be addressed by using simpler task instructions, or by more intensive subject preparation, allowing randomization of a larger number of series of fish.

The essential cognitive operation underlying the JTC effect is proposed to be a data gathering bias, whereby data collection is prematurely terminated (Garety and Freeman, 1999) or the threshold for acceptance of an option with no competitors is decreased (liberal acceptance; Moritz et al., 2007a). The current results suggest that at least some portion of the cognitive operations underlying delusions are tapped by the JTC paradigm, and may be state-dependent. This has implications for pharmaceutical and psychological interventions. With respect to pharmaceutical interventions, understanding the cognitive underpinnings of delusions and their neural substrates can provide a first step towards optimization of treatment responsiveness. Psychological interventions, such as individual and group-based CBT (Lecomte et al., 2003), and metacognitive training (MCT; Moritz et al., 2007b), are further supported by empirical data that the cognitive operations underlying delusions are related to JTC, and that these may be modified through a therapeutic approach (CBT) or a knowledge translation approach (MCT).

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