The Philosophy of Evolution

Does the earth rotate some distance from a "fixed" sun, or does the sun orbit a fixed earth? We know the answer today, but many centuries ago it caused a lot of people to reconsider evidence that seemed "so obvious" to them previously. Sometimes the same piece of proof, viewed from a slightly different perspective, suddenly looks completely different. That's the nature of open-minded investigation; being willing to reconsider underlying assumptions we previously held.

Whether one is doing something scientific, or just going through a normal day, we all make countless assumptions about the world around us. Most of our daily assumptions are unspoken, but some assumptions--particularly those that relate to philosophical pondering--are very well articulated and clearly understood. Descartes, when he began his quest for truth, began with a proposition "I think, therefore I am." He derived a series of truths that he considered to be based on this idea.

If we want to learn something about the world we live in then we need to make some assumptions. One of the unspoken assumptions that the scientific community holds in common is that there are some universal laws that govern everything. If this were not true, then we should not be surprised to find that in some locations in the universe rocks fall up instead of down. Another assumption is that these laws are discoverable. If this were not assumed, nobody would bother attempting to discover them, would they?

One assumption held by many scientists (all evolutionists) is that the universe is a closed system. This assumption has been labeled by several different names, including naturalism, materialism, or just plain atheism. Many scientists emphatically insist that the scientific endeavor will cease to function, and society will be thrown back into the stone age, if we allow any philosophy other than naturalism to guide our science. Is this concern warranted?

God? In science? What are you, nuts?

Before examining whether naturalism or supernaturalism is the better philosophy with which to begin the scientific process we should ask, "what is science?" How could somebody "do science" from a supernatural paradigm as opposed to a naturalistic paradigm?

What is science?

Science is... well, everybody just knows what science is. It is a bunch of guys in white lab coats with beakers boiling, trying to discover what happens when you mix chemical "A" and chemical "B." It's some guy with a kite in a lightening storm. It's a man under an apple tree about to simultaneously get bumped on the head and understand gravity, and some other guy gazing into the night sky with his telescope. It's a fellow in a brown suit wiping and adjusting his round spectacles to gain a better view of a rare reptile before he scribbles something into his notebook that is illegible to anybody but himself.

It may come as a surprise to many people to learn that there is no universally recognized definition of what science really is. Philosophers of science have long argued over the difference between "legitimate" science and "pseudo-" science, and they have not come to a conclusion that everybody can agree on. This may seem odd because we all intuitively know that there's something about science that is different from, say, poetry (as this author asserts), yet we cannot provide a certain and irrefutable definition of science, nor poetry.

The lack of a clear definition should not be taken as permission to call any and every crack-pot theory (perpetual motion machines come to mind) "scientific" any more than a lack of a clear definition of "poetry" permits us to apply that title to a users manual for a toaster. Even though the definition may not be clear, some things clearly are scientific, and some things clearly are not. The ambiguity should do one thing alone for us; cause us to think twice before dismissing the opinions of those who disagree with us.

The human element

One common factor in every scientific endeavour with which I am familiar, is the goal of discovery. We "do science" because we want to learn about, and understand, the world around us. We are trying to discover the facts about "stuff" at the same time as we are trying to gain insights into the "why." Why does the apple fall down? Does it always fall at the same speed? How do birds find their way back to their nests after migrating across a continent half a year ago? Regardless of what the final definition of science is, it seems to me that science is rooted almost entirely on a sense of awe and mystery about the world that is unique to humans.

In one sense, science is about the discovery of facts. I may wonder if all objects fall at about the same speed, regardless of their weight. To test the theory I simply drop a hammer and a feather and time their descents. The hammer, which is heavier, falls faster. I then conclude that, based on the evidence, heavier objects fall faster. Simple and done, right?

Not quite so simple, and not quite done, because our conclusion is wrong. When we see the feather floating we do not assume that all objects that are as light as a feather will descend just as slowly. The scientific method gathers data, but that data is then filtered through the human mind. We apply common sense and human intuition to the scientific information that we gather. Science is not merely about facts, the largest part of the scientific method is the role played by humans who try to understand the data, and find meaning in it.

This is where the problem arises. Human intuition and common sense are not the same for all humans. In part our intuitions are a product of our philosophies, but there is no way (that I know of) to irrefutably prove that any one philosophy is right and every other philosophy is wrong. Sure we all believe in our heart of hearts that whichever philosophy we hold to is the right one, but however strong my conviction is that I am right, that same strength of conviction is held by somebody else that they are right. The biggest reason why the definition of science is not perfectly clear is that humans have not yet proven which worldview is the right one.

The biggest philosophical dichotomy that relates to the definition of science is between naturalism and supernaturalism. Naturalism is the philosophy that all of reality is purely natural, and therefore within the realm of science to discover. Supernaturalists (be they Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, etc) believe there is more to reality than just the physical world, and that science cannot reasonably be used to understand those aspects of reality.

Some have suggested that if we doubt Naturalism, then any and all fanciful theories about life involving ghosts, fairies, deities, or Elvis risen from the dead, must all be evaluated. In one sense, this is accurate. Supernaturalism, by definition, allows for the possibility of explanations that run contrary to an atheistic worldview. If somebody were to seriously suggest that fairies influence the course of events in the world then we should give them the chance to investigate and defend their views, otherwise we are guilty of intellectual censorship. But I've never heard anybody suggest that fairies are involved, so until the theory of fairies is proposed let's consider the only alternative that has been seriously suggested; God.

Christianity and Science

Just as I cannot defend the hypothetical "fairy" explanation, I also cannot speak to supernatural worldviews other than Christianity. How exactly do Christians see the world differently from others?

Within Christianity I believe there is still some healthy debate going on about the exact role that God takes in the day to day operating of the universe. On the one hand God may have established the laws of physics to operate without the need for Him to keep things running. This does not remove Him from human history, it simply allows him to "play the guitar" without having to hold the strings in place.

On the other hand (as suggested in the first half of Heb 1:3) God may actually be the sustaining force that perpetuates the universe, and sustains life itself. Either way the assumption is that God keeps things running pretty much constantly and only either "steps in" (if He is more or less hands off) or "operates differently" (if He is a perpetual and active force) in those very rare occasions when a miracle is desired.

So "doing science" from a Christian perspective is essentially pretty much the same as "doing science" from an atheistic perspective most of the time. When a Christian notices that a feather descends slowly, they will, like the atheist, attribute that not to the weight of the feather, but to the resistance of the air. Whether God actively guides and sustains all the laws of physics or not is irrelevant to our ability to understand and explain the interaction of those laws of physics. With this view in mind science is basically the study of "how things work" without answering the question of why they work like that. Whether God is proactively maintaining the friction properties or air or not, under "normal" circumstances a feather falls slower than a hammer does on planet earth.

In some areas, however, Christians and naturalists will sharply differ in the "common sense" and "human intuition" that they apply to the scientific data. One of the biggest areas is the untestable, unrepeatable history of the world as a whole. As one author put it, "Either life arose as the result of purely undirected material processes or a guiding intelligence played a role." Naturalists assume that everything follows from natural causes and effects, so we can simply project those causes and effects back in time to figure out what happened. Christians are far more reluctant to assume that the entire history of the world was uninterrupted by God. Two reasons for this hesitation are the revelations we have received from God (ie. He specifically said that He's been involved) and the revelations we have received from the scientific data. The laws of physics in many cases seem to preclude natural explanations for what we see today.

The limits of science

Some have thought of this as the God-of-the-gaps approach to science, in that God is used to fill in all those pesky gaps in our scientific understanding of the world. Once a sufficient natural explanation can be invented, then God gets the boot. I would propose that a more accurate representation of "supernatural science" would be the God-of-the-walls perspective. There are some things for which, not only is there no satisfactory naturalistic answer, but the laws of physics suggest that there cannot be a naturalistic answer. Rather than a gap, scientists have hit a wall. Some examples include:

• The origin of the universe - How can something come from nothing?
• The origin of life - the basic chemicals that compose life, under normal conditions, will not mix in such a manner as to produce life. The only reason they work in life today is because life overrides their natural tendancies with contrived chemical conditions.
• The advent of complex life - the discovery of "irreducible complexity," popularized by Michael Behe, demonstrates that certain complex features in living nature could not function unless all of their parts were always present. Natural explanations involving gradual iterations are logically impossible.

Christians see these walls, not as gaps for which natural explanations will one day arise, but as impenetrable barriers that preclude natural explanations. The Christian worldview considers it perfectly reasonable to believe something other than a naturalistic explanation in these cases.

But is that no an inherently anti-scientific view? In the book "Three views on Creation and Evolution", part of the Zondervan "Counterpoint" series, Paul Nelson and John Mark Reynolds offer this humorously enlightening illustration of how one's rules of science might get in one's way of actually doing science.

Suppose you enjoy solving jigsaw puzzles, especially the most difficult ones with thousands of small pieces. As a useful rule of thumb, you adopt the practise of separating the edge pieces from the others and assembling them first. One day, as you start a new puzzle, a couple of your friends stop to watch. "What are you doing with those pieces?" they ask. After you explain your customary practise of assembling the edge pieces first, they grow interested - not in the puzzle itself, however, but in the rule of thumb. "What is an edge piece, really?" one of them asks, holding a piece to the light. Soon they have forgotten entirely about the puzzle and are writing learned treatises on "The Conventionality of Jigsaw Piece Ontology" and "The Methodological Necessity of Initial Border Establishment in Puzzle Construction," with a lot of laborious squabbling about definitions and formal principles. ("An edge piece may be defined as such if and only if it possesses no less than one rectilinear dimension longer than each of its other dimensions.") Yet, when you venture modestly that one need not start with the edge pieces, since colors or patterns are also helpful sometimes, they whack you over the head with their learned treatises. "Surely you must know," they say, with all the offended dignity that academics can muster, "that the Edge Piece and Primary Assembly Principles are rationally indisputable in the community of investigators. What are you, some kind of crank?"

Three views on Creation and Evolution - pg 57

Of course, the book "Three views" goes on to remind us that those who believe in God are also under an obligation to keep their initial assumption open to criticism. Those who believe more specifically in the God of the Bible are also under an obligation to keep their interpretation of the Bible open to criticism. Overall a fascinating (albeit biased) representation of the discussion between the three prevailing views.

Some have argued that science has certain rules - testability, falsifiability, etc - and that any explanation other than natural explanations do not fit these criteria. Stephen Meyers argues (www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_moreland.htm) that, should the same (supposedly metaphysically neutral) criteria be demanded of naturalistic accounts of our origins, they would also be disqualified. If the definition of "science" (as it pertains to the historical sciences of the origins debate) were to be expanded to include natural descent as one alternative, any kind of supernatural explanation would also have to be given fair consideration. In other words, while many people still cling to the idea that science must be done in a "naturalistic" manner, philosophers of science have recently concluded that such thinking is not based on neutral criteria, but on the metaphysical agenda of a group of people. There is no reason to exclude God from the equation.

True science is readily engaged in by people from a wide range of philosophical worldviews. Obviously those worldviews that deny the existence of a material realm will have difficulty "doing science," but they are the exception, not the rule. As one scientists has observed,

One of the glories of science is that people come together to do it who have all sorts of religious beliefs, philosophical views, cultural backgrounds, and political opinions. But as scientists they speak the same language. It is a wonderful fellowship. I have written research papers with colleagues (and friends) who are fierce atheists and think my Catholic beliefs are for the birds, and they know that I think their atheism is for the birds. Yet we respect each other as scientists.

http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/?p=111

Are Naturalism and an Ordered Universe Logically Consistent?

One thing that science has discovered about this world is that, for the most part it functions very predictably, so much so that based on our understanding of the laws of physics humanity has visited the moon! That alone tells us that we understand how things work, and they don't really change with time or location. Does that predictability and consistency preclude the existence of God? As one writer put it:

If supernaturalism were true, miracles would allow unique, non-repeating, and non-controllable events to cause natural effects that would be incomprehensible using empirical methods of investigation. Omnipotent deities could act arbitrarily and irrationally without compunction and violate natural laws for no humanly-comprehensible reason.

www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html

The point the author seems to be making is that the universe would operate differently if there were a God. This, of course, is presupposing that there currently is no God. The naturalist has no basis on which to claim that the universe would operate any differently IF God existed, because IF God does exist, then we already know what life would be like in a universe with a God. It would be exactly as it presently is.

There is an interesting observation that can be made from the fact that the laws of physics are what they are, and that they have remained consistent over the course of human history. The observation, however, is very unintuitive because we are so used to living in our world; a consistent world. Let me illustrate with a thought experiment.

When I drop an apple I know roughly how long it will take to fall depending on how far up I drop it from. That's because the present gravitational constant is something I've lived with all my life. What if it were different? What if the apples fell slower than they currently do? Well, that's no big deal, right? Heck, it might be kind of fun if gravity acted a little less than it does because then we could all jump a lot higher like the astronauts did on the moon!

But the impact of a lower gravitational constant would not be limited to apples and humans, but to the motion of the stars, and the ability of earth to keep an atmosphere. Start changing gravity and you start changing the very operation of the universe. In fact, some scientists have begun trying to imagine what the impact would be if some of the constants of the universe were noticeably different from what they currently are. The biggest conclusion is a simple one: we would not be here. An internet search for "anthropic principle" should yield more than enough reading material on that subject.

Here's another mind game; what if the universal constants were not the same everywhere you went? What if they changed depending on where you were in the universe, or what the time of day was? We would run into the same kinds of problems as we did in the previous example. How could we possibly survive in such a world? I would try to step up one stair only to find my leg suddenly weighing more than it used to so I trip on the stair. I would plug in my light only to find that the filament burns out the moment electricity is applied because the material constants had changed. These are minor examples; imagine if the planets constantly changed their orbits and the weather varied even more wildly than it presently does. Once again, I doubt we would be here.

According to one philosopher, an "infidel" (so hardly friendly to the anything pointing to God), the big bang singularity could just as easily have been followed by nothingness, instead of giving rise to three-dimensional space. Furthermore, even if it did give rise to three-dimensional space:

It is most likely to give rise to random or arbitrary particle configurations (giving an overall state of maximal disorder) and is not likely to give rise to a highly ordered system such as a flower or ant.

www.infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/cause.html

Now imagine the alternative, namely that there is a God who wanted to create us. If that's the case, then the universe would have to end up pretty close to what it actually is like. That may not be irrefutable proof, nor is it water-tight logic, but it sure makes me suspicious.

Naturalism is an unlikely explanation for the ordered universe we live in. Supernaturalism, on the other hand, would almost certainly lead to an ordered universe. Allowing God into the equation, while certainly allowing for the possibility of miracles, provides a basis for understanding why they would be the negligibly rare exception to the rule.

Is Naturalism Pragmatically Beneficial to science?

Can science survive in a Christian atmosphere? The easiest way to answer this question is to remember that science was born within the walls of Christian thinking. Many of the earliest scientists held an unwavering faith in God, and used their scientific endeavors to learn more about his character. Some names to include are Kepler, Galileo, Bacon (who established the scientific method), Pascal, Newton, Faraday, Mendel (discovered genetics, disliked Darwinism), and von Braun. To claim that belief in God would hinder scientific inquiry makes it necessary to back that claim considering many of the greatest advances in science were made by believers in God ( www.answersingenesis.org/home/area/bios/default.asp#pastsci).

In fact, consider the differences in the basic outlook of naturalism and supernaturalism. Naturalism assumes that life originated and we exist accidentally; supernaturalism assumes that life originated and we exist for a purpose. When reviewing the natural world, one would never look for purpose in anything, if they assumed that all life were an accident. Indeed, two examples come to mind that verify this. For many years the evolutionists claimed that vestigial (useless) organs were evidence of evolution; they used to serve a purpose, but do not any longer. Over time, and after more research, it was discovered that the vestigial organs do in fact serve various purposes in the operation of the living things. Next, the naturalists claimed that the genetic code was mostly "junk DNA," with the occasional piece of important information connected by masses of evolutionary leftovers. Only recently have they discovered that the genetic code is vastly more complex than originally assumed, and scientists are looking into the purpose behind what used to be called "junk."

One could argue that such thinking is the evolution-of-the-gaps philosophy; things we do not understand are assumed to be evolutionary leftovers until we discover that they have a purpose.

Now, if supernaturalism were to have been the prevailing philosophy, then the initial assumption would have been that the vestigial organs and the "junk DNA" served a purpose, as it seems unlikely that God would have created something that served no purpose. Supernaturalism would have looked for a purpose, whereas naturalism merely stumbles upon something they never bothered to look for because, from a naturalistic perspective, extra complexity requires extra explanations. As it stands, the operation of the biological world is vastly more complex than Darwin originally thought, and each added level of complexity makes a naturalistic explanation seem just that much more far fetched and "coincidental." As such, it becomes remarkably easy to see why scientists with a naturalistic mindset would like to avoid finding extra complexity, or purpose behind the way biology works.

On the other hand, supernaturalism welcomes more and more complexity, because each level of complexity just strengthens the case that nature could not have done this on its own. From a pragmatic point of view, supernaturalism is more likely to inspire an inquisitive perspective in scientists than is naturalism. The greater the level of inquiry, the greater the speed with which science can develop.

While supernaturalism and naturalism would eventually both lead to the same discoveries, supernaturalism is more likely to look for complexity in nature than naturalism is. Naturalism reluctantly acknowledges complexity, supernaturalism celebrates it. From a pragmatic level, supernaturalism is superior in that it hopes to find greater complexity in nature.

One biologist even went so far as to claim that "the ideology and philosophy of neo-Darwinism ... seriously hampers the development of science" (www.townhall.com/columnists/davidlimbaugh/dl20050805.shtml)

Is Naturalism Consistent with the Real World?

One of the interesting things about naturalism is that it has a difficult time dealing with immaterial realities that everybody takes for granted.

Science does give us reliable knowledge about the material universe, that is, about everything in the universe that is made of matter and energy.

...

Science is less reliable if we examine more difficult questions about the relationship of the material world to the immaterial world of the conscious mind: the world of thoughts, ideas, beliefs, dreams, truths, values, morals, meanings, purposes, intentions, reasons, logical relationships, imagination, free will, and self-awareness. All of these elements in a second, immaterial world are undoubtedly part of the nature, and science certainly helps to investigate them and provide reliable knowledge to help us understand them, but, on its own, it has not provided final answers to our questions about them.

Notice how he waters it down by claiming that science is only "less reliable" with regard to the immaterial world. Despite the inability of "science" to explain them, he includes these immaterial things in his definition of "the natural world."

Then, in an effort to discredit scientific creationism, he makes this comment:

But I maintain that there is at least one criterion of legitimate science that correctly identifies scientific creationism and all forms of supernatural explanation in science as pseudoscience. This is the criterion of testability.

Is he not aware that tests have been done for many years on the human mind, relationships, dreams, emotions, etc? After decades (centuries?) of testing, he is still accurate when he concludes that science has not provided final answers to our questions about the immaterial world. By his definition, the entire realm of "immaterial nature," as he calls it, must be pseudo-science. He writes this about supernaturalism:

No acceptable criteria exist or can exist for establishing the validity of supernatural events, so any example of supernaturalism is meaningless as a form of knowledge.

www.freeinquiry.com/naturalism.html

By his own admission, science has no final answer to questions about his "immaterial nature," and there seems to be no "acceptable criteria" for establishing the validity of those realities either, yet for some reason he does not feel that they are meaningless as a form of knowledge.

We must recall that the definitions of materialism and naturalism are remarkably similar. Naturalism, according to the author quoted above, simply acknowledges immaterial reality, whereas materialism does not. Naturalists seem to have no scientific basis for doing this, and it is likely based on a sense of reluctance toward needing to acount for various things that common human experience takes for granted. Even the definition of pseudo-science given by the author convincingly removes his immaterial natural world from reality. If he chooses to deny the existence of God based on a lack of testability, then he ought to to deny the existence of the immaterial world he speaks of, if he wishes to remain consistent.

However, the existence of immaterial things is intuitive to humans. In fact, there is reason to believe in their existence, beyond simple intuition.

Language involves a symbolic code, a vocabulary, and a set of grammatical rules to relay or record thought. Many of us spend most of our waking hours generating, processing, or disseminating linguistic data. Seldom do we reflect on the fact that language structures are clear manifestations of non-material reality.

This conclusion may be reached by observing the linguistic information itself is independent of its material carrier. The meaning or message does not depend on whether it is represented as sound waves in the air or as ink patterns on paper or as alignment of magnetic domains on a floppy disk or as voltage patterns in a transistor network. The message that a person has won the $100,000,000 lottery is the same whether that person receives the information by someone speaking at his door or by telephone or by mail or on television or over the Internet.

...

An immediate conclusion of these observations concerning linguistic information is that materialism, which has long been the dominant philosophical perspective in scientific circles, with its foundational presupposition that there is no non-material reality, is simply and plainly false. It is amazing that its falsification is so trivial.

www.icr.org/research/jb/debatehighlights.html

This quote is not intended to conclude that information is the only thing that is independent of the material world, however only one example of a non-material existence is necessary to demonstrate that materialistic philosophy is inadequate, and the naturalist philosophy even more confusing. Just to provide some more food-for-thought, here is an article dealing with the human mind that demonstrate that it is highly doubtful that any fully natural explanation for its operation will ever be conceived. This is illustrated best by the "Parable of the Cube." ( www.leaderu.com/offices/dembski/docs/bd-converting.html).

Naturalism does not seem to find support from the real world. There are too many examples of immaterial things that we intuitively know exist, but do not have a good "scientific" understanding of their operation. Just as science is unable to provide answers for the existence of information, the human mind, and so on, so science is unable to provide answers for God, faith, and so on. I do not understand how the naturalists can acknowledge that one exists and the other does not.

Supernaturalism, on the other hand, acknowledges the existence of that which we intuitively know, yet are scientifically unable to account for (despite generations of research). Furthermore, supernaturalism is also open to the possibility of an even greater reality that is essentially beyond the reach of naturalistic science. While naturalists reluctantly acknowledge the existence of immaterial things, supernaturalists are quite willing to admit the limitations of science, and freely acknowledge the existence of many parts of reality that are outside the realm of what can be investigated by the scientific method. In this sense, the real world seems to be most consistant with a supernatural account of reality.

Conclusions

At this point I hope I have successfully demonstrated three things:

1. Naturalism is not logically necessary for science
2. Naturalism is not pragmatically beneficial for science
3. Naturalism is not consistent with the real world

On the other hand, the presupposition of supernaturalism offers a good explanation for our orderly world. Supernaturalism offers several pragmatic benefits over naturalism, including a higher level of inquisitiveness, as was evidenced by the fact that Christians made many of the major discoveries that founded modern science. Supernaturalism also seems to coincide better with the real world, in that it freely acknowledges the existence of many things that are clearly not testable by science, things ranging from the human mind to the divine mind.