- Mr Basi
and others 2009 SCC 52 are charged in B.C. with government
corruption. Because a confidential informer provided police with
information, Crown refused to disclose information which tended to
identify the source. Defence asked the judge to look into whether
the documents were really privileged. The Crown was prepared to
explain to the judge why the information was privileged, but not in the
presence of defence counsel. Defence counsel offered to undertake
to keep all privileged information secret from their clients. The
trial judge figured that such a promise would sufficiently protect
informer privilege. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed.
Under no circumstances (except innocence at stake) should defence
counsel learn the identity of an informant.
This means is that your sources continue to remain confidential,
unless they witnessed or participated in the crime. It had become
increasingly popular in B.C. for defence counsel to offer to withhold
privileged information from their clients, in exchange for accessing
it. The Supreme Court of Canada put a stop to this practice.
-
How sure do you need to be that a specific offence occurred before you
can detain a suspect? On Highway 1, near Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan,
police officers saw Mr Yeh's,
2009 SKCA 112 car weave side to side on the road. They stopped
him to see if he was tired or impaired. There was no smell of
booze or drugs in the car, but his hands shook and he stared straight
ahead. Without telling him what they were doing, an officer
commenced Standardized Field Sobriety Tests for drug impairment.
Mr Yeh cooperated. The officer couldn't say Yeh was
impaired. He did form the suspicion that Yeh consumed marijuana
within the previous 4 hours. But the officer's training didn't
cover recency of consumption. The officer then detained Mr Yeh on
suspicion that he was transporting
narcotics, and deployed a drug-sniffing dog, which indicated
drugs.
A later search revealed $9,000 cash, 18 lbs of marijuana and lots of
ecstacy.
For technical reasons, seven judges heard this appeal instead of the
usual three. They criticized the officers for failing to tell Mr
Yeh the reasons for the detention. But this case wasn't about
s.10(a) of the Charter.
The officer didn't really explain any reasons beyond guesswork why
he thought Mr Yeh might be transporting drugs. If he smoked
drugs, to they extent that he smoked them, they were gone. There
were not "reasonable" grounds to suspect him, and therefore not
sufficient grounds to detain.
The Supreme Court of Canada made
it clear that deploying a drug dog requires "reasonable grounds to
suspect" the detainee of a drug offence.
- So many judges of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal heard Mr Yeh's
appeal (see above) because they wanted to clear up a previous decision
called Nguyen,
2008 SKCA 160. In that case, they said that you can't detain
someone unless you had a specific offence in mind. It's not a
problem if you receive a 911 call about a robber wearing a red
bandanna: you know there was
a robbery, and you have reason to
suspect people in the area who wear red bandannas. But
what if you don't know what the offence is, but you have reason to
suspect a crime? For example, when you encounter people who react
to uniformed police by hiding or discarding objects. (eg. Nesbeth
2009 ONCA 597) You don't know what the crime was, but you have
reason to suspect that one was committed.
6 judges of the 7 agreed that you can detain in either
circumstance. While this isn't news for B.C. or Ontario cops, it
should come as a relief to officers in Saskatchewan. Likely this
idea won't spread to other provinces now.
- New Brunswick police officers went to a
busy parking lot just off Highway 1 to meet with an informant.
While they waited, they saw a Nova Scotian rental vehicle perform heat
checks before parking in a spot with a view of the area. The
driver, Mr Tontarelli,
2009 NBCA 52 sat and waited. A Québec
vehicle turned up and parked beside it. The Nova Scotian driver
went to the passenger seat of the Québec
vehicle and the drivers shook hands. After 20 minutes, he emerged
carrying a duffel bag, which he stowed in his car, and the two vehicles
returned to the highway, each headed to their respective
provinces. The officers concluded this was a drug transaction,
and arrested. The duffel bag contained dope. The other car
contained $16,000. Naturally, defence argued that the officers
didn't have reasonable grounds. The trial judge and the appeal
judges found they did.
I think it's important to link your observations into
inferences.
This decision shows no such effort. It isn't difficult:
- Because of the way that the first guy moved his car, and kept
looking around the parking lot, I drew the inference that he was
concerned about who was watching him.
- Because the two vehicles came from different provinces, but met
in the lot, I figured that the meeting had been pre-arranged.
- Because the vehicles appeared to be returning to their respective
provinces, I figured that purpose of the meeting was achieved by the
transfer of the duffel bag.
- Because both vehicles appeared to have travelled a long way, for
the purpose only of the exchange, I figured the contents of the duffel
bag must have been valuable.
- Because of the concern about being observed, I figured that the
bag contained contraband of some sort.
In this case, the officers also had training and experience in drug
investigation. The officers did speak of their experience with
Highway 1 being a thoroughfare for drugs, and rental cars often used to
transport them.
Defence argued that after arresting
Tontarelli,
2009 NBCA 52 for an indictable offence, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, police still needed a warrant to search the
vehicle. I'm surprised anyone still thinks that after the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in
Caslake.
This decision explains clearly where that idea came from, and why it's
wrong.
One of the police officers didn't seem to know whether he "detained" or
"arrested" the driver. Be very clear. You can't search for
evidence of an offence after a "detention". You can search the
suspect and his or her vicinity for evidence of the offence after
"arrest".
- When an internet chatter says she's under age,
the accused is presumed to believe it unless he takes "reasonable
steps"
to find out how old the victim is. See 172.1(3) and (4). What are
"reasonable steps"?
In two cases, undercover officers impersonated 13-year-old kids on
sex-themed internet chatrooms. Mr Thain,
2009 ONCA 223 and Mr Levigne,
2009 ABCA 359 both testified that they thought that they were chatting
with adults, and gave reasons:
Thain
|
Lavigne |
- the chat-room was designated as adult-only;
- his observation before saying anything to mandy13 that she
was logged into a pornographic website unlikely to be frequented by a
child;
- when he asked her about her age, she stated that she was 13
but added “lol”, slang for “laugh out loud”, suggesting a joke;
- mandy13 used what he regarded as a joke e-mail address
- mandy13 purported not to have a photo available;
- mandy13 was familiar with a “blush” command, causing his
screen to turn pink, despite claiming to be new to the chat room.
|
- to enter the chat room, one must create a profile which
describes
you as over 18;
- moderators on the chat room will screen for and exclude
underage
participants;
- adults sometimes pretend to be minors;
- etownjessy13 typed fast.
|
Neither man took any steps himself to find out the age of the other
chatter beyond making the observations
listed above. The Ontario Court of Appeal thought that Mr Thain
had done
enough to assure himself. The Alberta Court of Appeal found that
Mr Lavigne didn't. They said that the accused must take reasonable steps himself
to ascertain the age of the other chatter. I don't think the two
decisions can be reconciled.
Regardless which approach prevails, undercover officers involved in
these investigations should carefully manage the digital impression
they give to the other chatter.
- Your prosecutors feel relief this week. Mathew
Miazga
2009 SCC 51 prosecuted a difficult child sexual abuse case
involving multiple adults. He got some convictions
at trial, and they were upheld on appeal, but the Supreme Court of
Canada ordered a retrial. Eventually, the children
recanted. The defendants sued him for malicious
prosecution. The trial judge said that it was so obvious that the
prosecution had no case that the prosecutor must not have believed that
the accused were guilty; he had to pay for the harm he did to them by
the prosecution. The Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that
several courts found that the accused were guilty. The case
couldn't have been so terribly weak. And besides, there is no
requirement that a public prosecutor personally believe in the guilt of
the accused. The prosecutor must assess the strength of the
evidence, and prosecute only for the purpose of bringing people to
justice. There was no evidence Miazga had any malicious purpose
in prosecuting the accused.
Most of this decision doesn't matter much to cops. It does
emphasize that the decision to prosecute belongs to the Crown, and that
courts should not second-guess this decision except in the clearest of
circumstances.
- Mr
Mulroney, 2009
ONCA 766 got busted for driving over .08. There must have been
something wrong with the certificate, because the qualified technician
had to testify. He forgot to say that the suspect blew "directly
into" the approved instrument, as required by s.258. At trial and
at two appeals, defence argued that the court must acquit. The
Court of Appeal agreed that there must be evidence that the samples
were given "directly into" the instrument. But in this case, the
evidence (just) sufficed.
Usually, the certificates of the qualified technicians cover this
point. Most officers don't have to worry about this point.
But if there's something wrong with the certificate, then this evidence
must be given in live testimony: "The suspect blew
directly into the instrument."
- Armed with a
search warrant, police officers searched an apartment for drugs.
It was a hive of drug trafficking activity. While they were
there, someone came to the door. Nobody could say whether the
door was locked. An officer posted inside at the door heard the
jingle of keys, and the door opened. Mr
Munif
2009 BCCA 451 came in, and was promptly arrested. He had keys in
his hand, and bundles of cash and a couple of cell phones in his
pockets. He had a few drugs packaged in street-level
quantities. Was he part of the trafficking operation, or was he
just a customer? Nobody tested the keys in the door. After
his conviction, he appealed, saying that the evidence linking him to
the trafficking operation wasn't strong enough. In this case, the
court upheld the conviction, but it was a near thing.
When you're investigating illicit property (stolen car, drug house,
etc), and you arrest a felon with keys, consider testing the keys to
see if they fit the locks.
- In the last few
days before Mr
Yonis's
2009 ABCA 336 drug trial someone realized that the certificates of
analysis had not been served on defence. Police officers went to
his lawyer's office and gave the certificates to the secretary.
They told her that the certificate would be tendered "next Thursday".
Like many sections of the Criminal Code, s.51 of the CDSA requires the
prosecution to give defence a copy of any certificate or report in the
case
along with notice of the
prosecution's intention to use the document at the hearing.
In this case, the trial judge found and the appeal court agreed:
although the certificates were adequately served on the lawyer, the
notice of intention to rely on them were not. The judges blamed
the lawyers:
"It is not difficult for the federal
Crown to create, and use, an adequate and informative style of written
notice of intention that incorporates the relevant certificates by
reference, and then to effect service of the written notice and copies
of the certificates either upon the accused personally, or upon defence
counsel acting for the accused. This latter service can be effected
either personally, or by service upon a person at his law office
authorized to accept service of documents."
But you know that the lawyers will download the work onto you. If
they ask you to serve a certificate, you might ask if there's a notice
of intention to go along with it.
- Police received a complaint of an impaired
driver. They found Mr
Caruth,
2009 ABCA 342 driving a car and wearing clothes which matched the
description given. He successfully blew into a screening device,
which registered a "fail", but when he returned to the police station,
he didn't blow hard enough into the instrument to get a proper
analysis. When asked why, he said "asthma". The officer
didn't test the instrument to see whether it would accept air.
Instead, relying on his own personal experience with asthma, the
officer took Mr Caruth at his word, and made a blood demand
instead. He gave Mr Caruth access to counsel, and then took him
to hospital to take blood. (No prizes for guessing whether his
blood-alcohol level exceeded .08mg%.)
Defence complained that the officer should have tested the instrument
immediately to determine whether it would accept a breath sample.
I agree. I can't count the number of cases I've seen recently
where the accused attempts and fails to provide a breath sample into a
screening device or breath analysis instrument, and the officer
concludes the investigation. Those officers will all face
cross-examination: "How do you know the instrument or the mouthpiece
wasn't blocked?" It's a simple matter to keep the mouthpiece and
blow some air through the instrument with a new one.
However, the court did not need to decide the case based on this
complaint. For the judges, the issue was whether taking a blood
sample was justified. Did the officer have
reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused was incapable of providing a breath sample? Defence
said the officer should have got a medical opinion before making the
blood demand.
The judges observed that you don't need proof beyond a reasonable doubt
to make a blood demand. It was appropriate for the officer - who
suffered asthma himself - to believe that asthma prevented Mr Caruth
from blowing. When someone complains of an inability to blow by
reason of a health condition, it's appropriate to ask a few questions
to satisfy yourself about the issue. If you think there is
substance to the complaint, you may be able to make a blood demand in
place of a breath demand ... even if the suspect successfully provided
one breath sample previously.
- When you suspect a motorist of
involvement in a crime, when can you use highway safety legislation (it
has different names in different provinces: M.V.A.; H.T.A.; T.S.A.) to
pull over the vehicle? In
Dhuna,
2009 ABCA 103, an officer in an unmarked car followed a vehicle.
It braked and turned every time a marked police vehicle came near
it. This officer worked in a car-theft squad. He checked
its plates, but nobody had reported this vehicle stolen.
Suspecting car theft anyway, he detained the driver to see if the car
was properly registered. Mr Dhuna responded by tossing away a bag
of cocaine. After arresting him, the officer found drugs and
weapons in the car. At trial, Mr Dhuna complained that the police
used traffic safety legislation to investigate car theft - which has
nothing to do with safety on the road.
The Court of Appeal found that car registration was as enforceable
under their T.S.A. as driver sobriety - the officer didn't need
"reasonable grounds to suspect" in order to check a driver's
registration. The fact that the officer was
also interested in car theft didn't
affect the lawfulness of the stop. (This is similar to the
Kaddoura,
2009 BCCA 113 case I wrote about in March.)
Does this mean that you can stop any vehicle on the road, any time you
want? No. The court also agreed with an older case,
Houben,
2006 SKCA 129. In that case an officer stopped a pickup truck in
a quiet neighborhood in the middle of the night. He was curious
about property crime, but had no reasonable grounds to suspect this
driver (who turned out to be drunk). Because the officer was not
concerned about traffic safety, that detention was arbitrary.
You can stop a car if you're actually investigating highway safety, or
if you have reasonable grounds to suspect that the driver is involved
in some kind of criminal activity.
Remember, if you do stop a vehicle (or anyone else), you must explain
the reason for your stop (s.10(a) of the
Charter). If you're stopping
a driver to determine if he's safe on the road, or registered and
insured, say so. But if you're stopping a driver because you
think he might be preparing his next B&E, don't pretend it's a
traffic stop. If you have both sets of concerns, it seems okay to
use one as the reason for the stop.
- Police in Manitoba
busted Mr
Grant,
2009 MBCA 9, a full-patch member of the Hell's Angels. They had
help: an established criminal acted as their agent in various large
drug transactions with Mr Grant. In order to prevent any
suggestion that the agent strayed into entrapment or other unlawful
conduct, the officers told him very clearly not to communicate with Mr
Grant except under police supervision and wiretap. What a
surprise! The agent did get together with Mr Grant several times
during the operation, allowing defence to suggest that the agent
avoided police recording in order to suppress evidence favourable to
the defence.
The case discusses the legal procedures around defence complaints of
non-disclosure. Those aren't of interest to you, except that the
prosecution won.
What protected the police in this case was careful and clear
documentation of the agent's instructions from the police. When a
criminal works with you, the terms of your agreements must be
particularly clear. "Understandings" will be misunderstood.
"Oral contracts" and "gentlemen's agreements" won't hold.
-
Fingerprints at the scene proves identity only if other evidence
establishes the context. Several men, including Mr Nalasco,
invaded a home in Hamilton. They demanded money and drugs from
the occupants who were drinking and smoking marijuana. The victims
cooperated at first, then resisted. One victim grabbed an axe and
struck one of the men. Mr Nalasco shot a gun, hurting a couple of
the victims. The attackers fled. A victim watched one of
them leap-frog over a car. He said he saw the guy place his hand
on the car to get over it. A fingerprint on the car came from Mr
Samuels,
2009 ONCA 719. Was Mr Samuels one of the attackers? Or did
his fingerprint just happen to be there from some accidental touching
at some other time?
A police officer testified that 3 years earlier, he found Mr Samuels
associating with Mr Nalasco. This was admissible evidence to help
show that the presence of the fingerprint was more than just an unlucky
coincidence. (Isn't it amazing how many "hitchhikers" you find
riding in stolen cars? Evidence of prior association undermines
this classic claim.)
The appeal court didn't care much for the association evidence, but
liked the careful examination of the scene where the fingerprint was
found.
A sharp-eyed officer had noticed a footprint in the mud approaching the
car on the path taken by the attacker, and a fresh muddy dent on the
car in a location consistent with the leap-frog motion described by the
witness. Someone had the bright idea of asking the car's the
owner about the damage: they learned it wasn't there the night before.
In my opinion, both sorts of evidence were worth collecting.
Fingerprints can be explained away. "I could have touched that
car when it was driving around town." Protecting, examining and
investigating the scene of a print often provides more information than
the print itself. And it's more difficult to believe that the
suspect's fingerprints innocently appeared where his buddy and friends
committed a crime.
- In May of
last year, the section numbers for impaired driving and over .08
changed from s.253(a) & (b) to s.253(1)(a) & (b). I just
encountered
this
odd decision which asserts that a Notice to Seek Greater Punishment
which recites the old section numbers is ineffective. Although I
respectfully differ with the judge's reasoning, I do agree that your
forms should be corrected and updated.
- When an officer pulled over Ms
Devries
2009 ONCA 477, he figured she was too drunk to drive. He demanded
her breath and read her rights, and asked her if she wanted to speak to
a lawyer. She said no. When he got her back to the police
station, he didn't ask her a second time whether she wanted to speak to
a lawyer, but proceeded with the breath tests. She argued that,
at the roadside, the officer should have explained that access to
counsel would occur at the police station. The court rejected
that idea, and upheld her conviction.
The judges did agree that even if the suspect rejects the roadside
offer of legal advice it's a good idea to ask a second time when you
arrive at the police station.
- What should you do if the
suspect comes out of the phone room saying that the lawyer told him to
do something really strange?
Mr
Beers 2009 NBQB 149 (not
published - email me if you need a copy) crashed his car, killing a
14-year old pedestrian.
Police believed he was drunk, and made a breath demand. After he
spoke with Legal Aid, he told the officer that the lawyer advised him
to refuse. (It is, of course, a crime to refuse, and it is a
crime to counsel another person to commit an offence.)
An officer advised him that the offences of impaired causing death and
refusal were similar. The officer told Mr Beers
and the lawyer that he thought the
lawyer committed a criminal offence and would be investigated. Mr
Beers talked to the lawyer again, and decided to blow. At trial,
he complained that the officer violated his right to counsel. The
trial judge agreed.
The officer was correct that counselling a refusal
is counselling the commission of an
offence. Back then, lawyers who advised their clients used to do
so very carefully: "If you refuse you could get
five years. If you blow, you
could get
life." The
client might interpret this as a recommendation to refuse to
blow. But if you read those sentences again, you will see that it
isn't. The judge wasn't prepared to find that the lawyer did
commit an offence.
The officer was wrong when he said refusal and impaired causing death
were similar. At the time the offences carried very different
penalties.
(By the way, the penalties are now the same for impaired, over .08 and
refusal:
Injury
|
Max
Penalty
|
None
|
5 years
|
Bodily harm
|
10 years
|
Death
|
Life
|
The officer was wrong then, but would now be right.)
Because of the death of an innocent youth, tempers ran high. The
officer's behaviour intimidated Mr Beers and the lawyer, effectively
changing the legal advice. That's where the problem lay.
So what should you do when the lawyer appears to give the suspect bad
legal advice? Consider the principles involved:
Do
|
Don't
|
- Promptly provide access to legal advice.
- Treat suspect fairly.
- Warn suspect against committing offences.
|
- Give legal advice.
- Inquire into the legal advice given. (It's
privileged.)
- Undermine the solicitor-client relationship. (Telling
the suspect that the lawyer gave bad advice is a no-no.)
|
When you think the suspect got bad legal advice, I think the strongest
you can say is something like this:
I am not a lawyer, and I can't give you
legal advice. But what you're saying sounds a bit strange to
me. If you want an opportunity to get a second opinion, I will
help you get that. Do you want another opportunity to get legal
advice?
When someone refuses, you can say:
Refusal is a criminal offence for which
I will charge you. Do you understand?
- When police
arrested Mr
Narwal
2009 BCCA 410 for kidnapping and extortion, Cst McLaughlin arranged to
record the interview on video. But Narwal told the officer that
he wouldn't speak about the victim on the record. He pointed at
the camera. Cst McLaughlin agreed to go "off the record".
Mr Narwal explained that the victim killed some drug couriers and kept
the dope. Narwal and his buddies were just trying to get
their money back. He was trying to divert the investigation
toward a murder, and away from the kidnapping. Crown tendered
this conversation at Narwal's trial. Defence objected that it
wasn't recorded, and police tricked Mr Narwal.
The court agreed unanimously that
if
you have a good reason not to record a conversation with the
suspect, then the absence of a recording does not prevent the court
from hearing the conversation as recorded by the officer.
The majority found that there was no trick. It was the accused's
idea in the first place. One judge disagreed. This means Mr
Narwal can get another opinion from the Supreme Court of Canada.
For you folks:
- Always try to record conversation with the suspect on audio or
video. Courts demand a recording, or a good reason why you didn't.
- If you do get unrecorded conversation about the offence, make
very detailed notes immediately. Cst McLaughlin spent a long time
recording everything he could remember about this conversation.
The work paid off.
- Don't offer "off the record" discussions. Avoid them.
But if the suspect offers it, you can
do it.
- Cops, Guns & Organized Crime - New criminal code offences came
into force today. It looks good on the surface, but carries some
hidden gotchas. Here are some highlights of
Bill
C-14:
Section 270.01 defines offences of assaulting a peace officer with a
weapon, or causing bodily harm. Section 270.02 defines aggravated
assault of a peace officer. This might seem good, because
serious assaults on peace officers deserve more serious treatment in
the Code. Until now, if someone assaulted a peace officer using a
weapon or causing harm, it took two charges to cover all the legal
elements. Now it takes only one. Before October 1, 2009, we
could get two convictions for someone who hurts a cop or attacks one
with a weapon. Now we get one. The penalties remain
essentially the same.
When sentencing offenders who assaulted peace officers, judges must now
give denunciation and deterrence prime consideration.
s.718.02. This indicates Parliament wants these offenders
sentenced more harshly than before.
Section 244.2 now defines an offence of recklessly shooting a firearm
in the direction of people, or where they might get hurt. There
are minimum penalties for the use of restricted or prohibited firearms.
This means that gangsters who engage in shootouts in public
places get serious jail time, even if they hit no one. It also
means that police officers who fire their service pistols recklessly
may go to jail for a
minimum
of 5 years. Have you considered the benefits of taking a
refresher course of firearms training?
Peace bonds for gangsters can now be 2 years long!
Murders committed for organized crime become
first degree murder, even if they
were not planned and deliberate.
- When Cst Penny
demanded breath samples from Mr
MacDonald
Brown v. R., 2009 NBCA 27, Cst Penny also told him about his right
to counsel. Mr MacDonald-Brown asked to call his parents.
Cst Penny let him talk with his parents for 20 minutes. After
that Cst Penny asked again whether he wanted to speak with a
lawyer. He did, but he didn't name any lawyer, and Cst Penny
didn't ask for a name. Cst Penny called duty counsel. At
trial, Mr MacDonald-Brown complained that he didn't get to speak to the
lawyer of his choice - Mr Cooper.
In this case, the Court of Appeal rejected this complaint. If Mr
MacDonald-Brown wanted a specific lawyer, he should have said so.
But the court decided this way because Cst Penny created an "atmosphere
of cooperation" with Mr MacDonald-Brown. It is simpler and may
avoid much litigation if you put the question squarely to the suspect:
"Do you want to call a lawyer?"
"Who do you want to call?"
If the suspect doesn't know the name of any criminal lawyer, you can
suggest duty counsel. But the suspect may wish to check the
Yellow Pages, or call a friend. These are reasonable steps, and
you should facilitate them as much as available resources allow.
Create that "atmosphere of cooperation" which justified Cst Penny's
actions. (The call to a friend to get the name of a lawyer is
not a privileged
conversation. It does not require privacy.)
A "reasonable opportunity" to get legal advice may require more than
one conversation with a lawyer. This week, my office reviewed a
report which described how a suspect spoke with Legal Aid for 4
minutes, but complained that that the lawyer wasn't interested in his
situation. He wanted to speak to another lawyer, but the police
officer wouldn't allow it. I don't think a judge would be
impressed.
While we're on the topic, have you checked whether the legal
directories available to your suspects are up-to-date?
- Mr
Cole,
2009 CanLII 20699 (ON S.C.), a high-school teacher, received a laptop
for the purposes of teaching. Somehow, nude photos of a student
of the school found their way onto his hard drive. School
technicians found the offending material, and the school seized the
computer back from him, and gave it to the police to examine. Mr
Cole complained that he enjoyed an expectation of privacy over the
contents of the computer. The trial judge agreed, but the appeal
judge did not. The school's ownership and acceptable use policies
clearly set out that they could examine his data. He did not
enjoy an expectation of privacy over the laptop computer.
When a business complains that contraband arrived on an employee's
computer, you should ask what policies govern the employee's
computer. Does the company have the right to look inside the
computer? If they do, then they have the authority to ask you to
look too. - Police officers on patrol
noticed the occupants of a vehicle react strongly to police
presence. The car pulled off the road into a parking lot.
The officers followed, making computer queries as they did. The
vehicle was related to bail breaches and Marijuana trafficking.
An officer approached the car, and smelled fresh marijuana
smoke. He arrested the occupants for possession of
marijuana, but found only cocaine, in the possession of Mr
S.T.P.,
2009 NSCA 86. Mr S.T.P. complained of unlawful arrest.
The offence of possession of small quantities of marijuana is a summary
conviction offence, for which an officer may only arrest if the officer
"finds" him "committing" the offence. This officer may have had
reasonable grounds to believe that S.T.P. still had marijuana in his
possession, but didn't actually see it. In
Janvier,
2007 SKCA 147, that court said you must actually observe the offence
before you can arrest. But this court found that you may draw
reasonable inferences
from your observations to conclude that the person "is committing" an
offence.
No police officers can arrest based on the smell of marijuana smoke
alone. But the smell, combined with other observations may lead
an officer to believe reasonably that a suspect still possesses some
marijuana. In Nova Scotia, that officer can arrest the
suspect. In Saskatchewan, that officer can not. For the
rest of us, the answer is less clear. If you find yourself in
that situation, you certainly have reasonable grounds to detain a
person for investigation. You just can't search for evidence of
the offence.
-
Having formed reasonable grounds to suspect that there was a marijuana
grow operation and Mr
Gomboc's,
2009 ABCA 276 residence, police attached a Digital Recording Ammeter
(DRA) to his power line. This gave them enough evidence to get a
warrant. 2 judges of the Alberta Court of Appeal found they
violated his expectations of privacy. 1 didn't. Maybe
the Supreme Court of Canada will hear this one.
- A plainclothes police
officer, saw an adult and a teen in a Green Cavalier, associating with
drug users. A similar car had been used in a fraud a month
earlier. The officer called for backup, and after they arrived,
approached the driver's side on foot. He showed his badge, called
out police, but had to ask 3 times for the driver to roll down his
window. With his right hand, the driver, Mr
Crocker,
2009 BCCA 388 tucked a folder or envelope under his seat; his left hand
clutched something tight. When the driver finally rolled down the
window, the officer demanded that he open his left hand. In it
was drugs. The officer seized the drugs, but Crocker took
off. When police finally caught him, they found a counterfeit
cash and identification mill.
Was the original demand "open your hand" an reasonable search
incidental to detention?
At court Johnson explained that he suspected that Crocker could have
had a weapon in his hand, and therefore his demand was a search for
officer safety. Defence complained that:
- Johnson had no specific reason to expect violence from Crocker -
the only offence he knew about was a fraud.
- Johnson could describe no specific weapon that thought might be
in Crocker's hand
- Crocker showed no hostility
The trial judge agreed, and dismissed all charges. The appeal
court disagreed. In a strong, clear, unanimous ruling, the court
identified the risks you officers face every day while doing your duty
to investigate crime. When detaining an unknown suspect, you
don't need to wait for risks to become overt before checking them
out. Courts should be reluctant to second-guess you when you have
safety concerns. Crown will recite this decision for years to
come.
I must add my usual caution: Please don't use officer safety as an
excuse to search for evidence. If you do, you will lose
credibility for yourself, and judges like the trial judge will
second-guess even the honest efforts of other police officers to
protect themselves from risk.
- When the police finally caught up to Mr
Crocker,
2009 BCCA 388 (see details above), it was in the apartment building
where he and his daughter shared a suite. They arrested him in
the underground parking area as he was getting into the green
Cavalier. He possessed lots of drugs, $
25,790
of counterfeit money, fake id and profiling information. The
officers figured there would be more evidence in the suite.
Fearing that the daughter would destroy the evidence before the
officers could get a search warrant, the officers entered it and
cleared the scene, removing the daughter.
Defence complained that this warrantless search was unreasonable:
although the officers knew that the daughter was in the suite, they had
no reason to believe that she knew anything about Crocker's arrest.
The trial judge and the Court of Appeal agreed. You need
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be lost or destroyed
in order to enter a residence without a warrant.
Please note: you don't need "reasonable grounds to believe" to enter to
protect a person from death or serious injury. In those cases,
you need only reasonable grounds to
suspect
the harm.
- The officers who
arrested Mr
Crocker,
2009 BCCA 388 (see details above) made two dumb mistakes. They
elicited information from him about the offence before respecting his
right to counsel (s.10), and they performed an unnecessary strip
search, contrary to policy, when they lodged him in cells (s.8).
These breaches added fuel to defence counsel's fire. Defence
asked the judge to exclude all the evidence found because the police
didn't respect Mr Crocker's rights.
In the reports I read, I see these mistakes too often.
Immediately after arrest,
do not ask
the suspect about the offence.
"You're under arrest for assault.
Why did you hit Mary?"
Not only will the answer you get be excluded from evidence, but it may
lead the judge (like the trial judge in Crocker) to exclude a bunch of
other evidence too.
Deal with s.10 first. Then you should (always) ask the suspect
for his or her version.
Because the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge about some
of the breaches, the result of the appeal favoured the
prosecution. But the appeal might not have been necessary if the
officers had followed the basic rules about rights to counsel and
whether to strip search.
For
older stuff, click here.
More and more legal knowledge is expected of police officers investigating crime. I offer here some thoughts on criminal law. I hope they help.
These are my opinions only, not those of any government agency. Please do not view them as a substitute for legal advice. If you find errors or have suggestions, please email me.