Daniel Chew Huicong Mistaken Assumptions about Foreknowledge

Daniel Chew Huicong, a calvinist, tries to disprove God predestinates by foreknowing our free-choice. So he cites an argument by open theists (those who deny God has infinite foreknowledge). William Hasker's 7 point argument is presented in Clark H. Pinnok's, The Openness of God (1994), p. 148. Daniel says it shows "...the incoherence of Arminian simple foreknowledge with its belief in libertarian free will." Arminians don't believe in libertarian free will, defined as "belief that human beings possess free will, that free will is incompatible with determinism, and that determinism is false." Arminians believe determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism. Determinism is defined as "every event, including human cognition and behavior, decision and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences." This is how God can foreknow our free-choices, because God can see all possible worlds, but He only actualizes the world with the free-choices in this world we have; hence, He can foresees all causal influences. The determinism, therefore, of osas arminianism is not the same as that of calvinism, because the latter is just forced whereas the determinism of osas arminianism and molinism occurs in the backdrop of God choosing the decision tree of free choices for an optimal world and timeline that saves the most and damns the least.

We arminians (Christians) believe that God made us in His image with free will and the cause of our choices is us, because we were given that sovereignty by God, though His sovereignty of course is still above ours. God being the cause of us (but not our choices), let's us choose which He can foresee. This allows for determinism and free will to be completely compatible. The mistake made by Daniel is misrepresenting arminians. The reason I believe he makes this mistake is because Daniel assumes "total depravity," the nature of man is "total inability" from the fall. So when a person believes by faith in Christ, the calvinist assumes this is contrary to man's nature and hence assumes it is libertarian free will. The mistaken assumption by the calvinist is in assuming all the verses that speak of "propensity to sin" refer to total inability. David was a man after God's own heart and was called "perfect"; but, surely, he still sinned. Likewise, though man is fallen, it doesn't mean he can't do the dishes.

Here is the argument used by Daniel, interpreting it from Pinnok who cited it from Hasker:

Suppose that there is a person known as Clarence who is addicted to cheese omelets. Will Clarence have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow morning, or won't he? The argument proceeds as follows:

1. It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (Premise)

2. It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or fail to believe anything that is true (Premise: divine omniscience)

3. God has always believe that Clarence will have a cheese omelet tomorrow (From 1, 2)

4, If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Premise: the unalterability of the past)

5. Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast (From 3,4)

6. It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does not in fact have one (From 2)

7. Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5,6).

This argument fails at step 3 because of its premise it is equating eating a cheese omelet tomorrow with never choosing the cross (total depravity) to try to prove God does not have infinite foreknowledge in step 7. Since this assumption about total depravity is false, the whole argument falls apart. God could believe it because He has infinite foreknowledge to foresee our free-choice. To not have infinite foreknowledge leaves only one choice which is his god is the cause of everything including sin because the calvinism or open theist god does not have the power to predestinate by foreknowing our free-choice. It is a faulty argument to say because his god believes something will happen, it must happen then there can't be infinite foreknowledge. It is assuming total inability, but there are no verses in the Bible for total depravity.

The simplicity of God's salvation is most glorious! What does God really believe in step 3? He created everyone with free will-the omelet. Some will accept the cross, some won't, by their own free will. The cheese omelet for breakfast should represent the fact man has free will and will choose according his own volition even when God does everything He can possibly do to convince and convict the person in the need for salvation. So step 7 would read that it is not in Clarence's power to circumvent his own free will which proves God has infinite foreknowledge of our free will. We, therefore, conclude the statement below by open theists and calvinists to be false:

The main point of this argument is to show that human actions according to the simple foreknowledge scheme cannot be made by libertarian free will, which undercuts the entire focus of the Arminian belief system. This logical refutal of Arminian simple foreknowledge is thus valid and sound, and thus Arminianism is rendered philosophically incoherent. So Clarence's eating the omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice (From the definition of [libertarian] free will) What this argument shows is that it is logically impossible that God should have foreknowledge of a genuinely free action. It follows from this that if there are actions that are free in the libertarian sense, it is logically impossible for God to know in advance how such actions will turn out. Hasker then continues by stating that the best evasion from this argument that he has seen so far states that God's knowledge of what Clarence will do does not cause Clarence to eat the omelet (Openness, p. 149). However, he similarly states that althought this may be true, it is irrelevant to the argument as presented, which does not make any claim to the effect that God's beliefs are the cause of human actions, which I concur.

Since God's beliefs are not the cause of our free-choices and all Hasker was trying to do was provide an argument for God not having infinite foreknowledge he nonetheless failed, for God is all-knowing (omniscient) he admits. This sounds like double talk by Hasker, because notice in step 2 omniscience was stated, but then denied it in the above paragraph. Furthermore, there is no basis for total depravity, so that is why God's beliefs directly correlate with His infinite foreknowledge of our free-choices. If total depravity were true then God's beliefs would not necessitate infinite foreknowledge. But the Bible is clear, there is no total depravity, but there is propensity to sin.

Conclusion: God's foreknowledge of our free-choices is valid and therefore, calvinism is false, because we all have opportunity to receive the cross. We are not totally deprave.

Troy Brooks