Conclusion

Like the first game I think I played a competent game overall, nothing brilliant, with only a couple ‘obvious’ errors like operating the Stuart alone and the initial attack on Hill 1 against unknown opposition. Again like the first it wasn’t a ‘typical’ style of game for me either. Not sure why, but I never analyzed Priest’s force this game like the last. After playing many CM games, whether consciously or unconsciously, you seem to ‘know’ from what has been shown what your opponent has left, ie the ‘cost’ of units when purchasing. If I had been paying attention to that, I think I would have attacked sooner and quicker on the right and center after seeing his large armour group on the left flank. Regardless, things went my way there anyways.

The one decision open to debate, and one I am a little disappointed about going unanswered, was whether the choice to reserve Task Force Drake to attack up the center and eventually hook left, was a better one than using the TF to reinforce Task Force Lewis directly. In retrospect I wish Priest had conducted his main attack more skillfully, especially in using his artillery, in order to proceed further with the game and explore more in-depth the many ‘what-ifs’. It could have been much more interesting.

Priest’s only comments on the game were as follows:

”Now to answer some of your questions:

Mainly I had a couple of thoughts at setup.  First I setup a recce group, which was basically one security company and the 4 ACs, along with three MG 42 teams and two 75mm PAK guns.  I had what would be considered a "hold group" that consisted of a rifle company, two Stugs, one Stuh, and two Hetzers.  The last group I had was my assault group of two company of rifle infantry, 10 Panzer IVs, and 5 Panthers.  Then I had of course my artillery contingent, a mix of 81mm mortars and 105mm guns.  Initially my plan was to use my recce screen for as long as possible.  My push was going to always come on that flank.  My AC's were always supposed to be up front, my Stuh along with the Hetzers were to provide a presence, something to make you think.  All in all the initial part went fine, I was more than willing to trade my holding forces for time to get "around the bend" on my assault.  The key was doing so while still being a formidable presence and that did not work out.  Also your artillery barrage (the initial one) did not do much at all, it hit my tanks but did not damage or cause any TC casualties, luckily my infantry had already moved through the area for the most part.  The later barrage caused some but not as many casualties as you would have preferred me thinks.  Right now you are excelling at preventing me from "getting rolling" which is what I do best.”

I think there are a few things to be learned from this game, and the last one also. To tie these two games together I will refer again to the thread that started it all Attack - what's harder? Defending or attacking? There were quite a few ‘nuggets’ in that thread by different posters but to keep it from being purely academic you need to see or experience it in practice. All these factors, hardly exhaustive, are all inter-related and important IMO.

Armour focus/Armour ‘philosophy’

This is the aspect that initially caught my eye when the discussion was pointed out to me and the one I was most curious about. I felt the handling of armour was one of my more weaker areas in CMBO and something that could use improvement, which in turn led to the challenge and the playing of the two games with Priest.

For reference, in the first game as the Germans my force structure included 38% armour (44% with the 20mm/75mm HTs), while Priest’s was 51% armour (54% with the ACs) as British. In the second game as the Brits my force comprised 45% armour while 54% armour (59% with the ACs) made up Priest’s German force. Priest certainly went an armour heavy route and I compensated also, especially in the second game, by selecting more than I usually do.

Priest’s stated philosophy was to form ‘combat groups’ with armour as the core and to win the armour war by identifying the enemy, controlling/denying positions, having the initiative and achieving local gun superiority. If the enemy didn’t reveal their armour in reaction to his moves then he would simply use his to attrit the enemy infantry. He consistently won the armour battles by applying these principles.

I can certainly agree with all of these principles except for forming combat groups with armour as the core. It is still my opinion that an integrated combined-arms approach will serve best; armour is a player but not the dominant one.

Priest expressed dissatisfaction in both games at his inability to ‘get rolling’. Perhaps that was the key for him that worked in certain situations against certain opponents but didn’t happen for him in our two games for reasons seen in the AARs. My ‘bent’ has always been towards the adage “Find them, fix them, destroy them then keep moving” which was unquestionably successful here. For me the ‘get rolling’ stage occurs after I have dislocated the enemy, not before.

In both games I always felt I had the initiative and determined the battles to my advantage re local gun superiority, and don’t think Priest ever had it, though he probably felt otherwise while playing! Initiative is being one step (or two) ahead of your opponent, planning and anticipating your enemy’s moves and being ‘there’ ready. It is pressuring your opponent and having him react instead of act, whether directly or indirectly.

I consistently kept Priest off balance throughout AAR 1 right from the start, even if it was him that was doing the majority of the ‘moving’. The placement of the HMGs, the attack up Hill 1, the sudden appearance of Armour Group 1, his attacks that hit nothing then simply sat ‘still’, all pressured Priest and kept him one step behind. Priest could have regained the initiative by assembling and attacking from Hill 1 after my own unsuccessful attack but he lacked either the confidence or foresight to do so.

Priest’s attack down the left flank in AAR 2 was in fact just a big gamble in light of the deteriorating situation for him everywhere else on the map. Every move his armour made was countered and eventually ended in its destruction. The only place where I had lost the initiative was the inconclusive fighting around the large VF in the valley but that remained inconsequential throughout the remainder of the game. Even if Priest had somehow broken through the left flank with a ‘viable’ force where would that have left him? What would it have accomplished to further his ends in determining the battle?

Intelligence of the enemy is key to any successful engagement and something to actively obtain if necessary. IMO everything that occurs in a battle hangs on this. If you don’t know what you are trying to ‘hit’ or even know if you will ‘hit’ anything then what are you accomplishing? I think the critical failure of Priest in both games was not having adequate intelligence of my forces or intentions.

The purpose of my attack up Hill 1 in AAR 1 was partially to identify Priest’s tanks. If they were Churchills as I had first recognized them to be, then that would have influenced the actions of Armour Group 1 as I would have known without doubt I couldn’t engage at range and would have to then either close the distance or work some flank attacks. As it turned out they weren’t Churchills and I decided to commit the armour from range at that point.

The forward placement of the two HMGs in AAR 1 undoubtedly were ‘bait’ and served their purpose of focusing Priest’s attention and drawing out his forces in his two main attacks which revealed to me their identity and location. It allowed me to plan and act accordingly.

In AAR 2 Priest had no idea about my force’s location, composition or intent, not until after he had surrendered (!); whereas I had pretty good intelligence throughout the battle by occupying *key* terrain and probing where required. I based my actions (successful for the most part) on that. His attack up the left flank with the bulk of his force was ‘seen’ early on and can only be viewed as a throw of the dice; I couldn’t even call it ‘calculated risk’ as he was completely in the dark as to what lay in wait there. Even if for some unknown reason my left flank had been open, the early intel of Priest’s intentions would have allowed me to respond in a timely manner.

I have always attributed certain events in CM to ‘luck’ or perhaps fate is a better word. There is no question in my mind it is a factor in deciding the outcome of a battle. I think the evidence is there in every game to see, sometimes it appears inconsequential but those little things shape the events to come. It was certainly luck that the Reserve Armour Group in AAR 1 missed 8 shots on the distant Firefly after getting the drop on it while it scored a ‘kill’ with its first shot. It was luck that allowed the Cromwell VI from TF Vickers in AAR 2 to survive the faust hit; it was luck said Faust team wasn’t quickly eliminated with a British squad parked right beside it! It was lucky the TacAI popped smoke for the AFVs of Armour Group 2 in AAR 1 as the Cromwells were outflanking them and the Firefly had the drop on them from Hill 3.

Overall both games were rewarding and challenging and a further learning experience in CMBO. Compliments again to Winecape for the setting up and to Priest for an enjoyable match and exchange.

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